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Theism and Psychological Science:
A Call for Rapprochement
Michael J. Vogel, Tyler A. Gerdin, and Mark R. McMinn*
Abstract
The authors offer two arguments for the inclusion of theism in natural science. First, an
argument against excluding theism is offered. Though early roots of science promoted a
view that it is a way to accumulate knowledge that is untainted by presuppositions and
traditions, postmodern critiques call this into question. Scientists have sometimes rejected
religion as a context-dependent, tradition-based way of knowing, yet science itself is also
context-dependent and tradition-based. Second, an argument for including theism in psychological is offered. Theistic beliefs are relevant insofar as they are part of human experience for many, they represent a form of human diversity, and they have been associated
with some positive health outcomes.
Keywords: psychological science, theism, philosophy of science, ethics

To the psychologist the religious propensities of [individuals] must be at least as interesting as any other of
the facts pertaining to [their] mental constitution. It
would seem, therefore, as a psychologist, the natural
thing for me would be to invite you to a descriptive
survey of those religious propensities.
—William James (1902/1961, p. 4)

James, the founding figure of American psychological science, was committed to the study of religion (Fancher, 2000). For him, the scientific
exploration of theism was as interesting as it was necessary for understanding the human experience. There was no desire to separate science
and religion. However, this position began to shift during the 20th century
as particular philosophical assumptions took root in psychological science
(Miller & Thoresen, 2003). It now seems common to notice shelves full of
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bestselling books attempting to discredit theistic religion and demanding
its exclusion from science (e.g., Dawkins, 1996, 2006; Dennett, 1996, 2006;
Stenger, 2007). The once strong relationship between theism and psychological science is at present on the brink of collapse, and much is at
stake.
In what follows, we suggest that the usual grounds for excluding theism
are insufficient and begin by acknowledging some of the philosophical
assumptions at the core of this debate.
The Argument against Excluding Theism
The earliest justifications for science were predicated on belief in a divine
being (Stark, 2003). It seemed that a divine being had created an ordered,
intelligible world for humanity to freely explore, and the methods that
would become central to science made this exploration possible. That a
theistic worldview created the initial rationale for the scientific endeavor
renders the present charge to defend the possibility of theism in science
quite an intriguing paradox.
Although common objections to the inclusion of theism in psychological science are complex, they often pertain to incompatible ways of
knowing. Owing to the fact that science seems accountable to highly rigorous, context-independent standards for knowledge, it has been given
prerogative over the extra-scientific conclusions of theistic traditions.
Context-independent refers to knowing that is reliable and not limited to
particular reference points or audiences. We prefer this term to objective
knowing. Context-dependent, on the other hand, refers to knowing that is
reliable but limited to particular reference points or audiences. We prefer
this term to subjective knowing. Extra-scientific refers to claims that are
not known through scientific methods; they are situated outside of the
province of science.
It seems that many psychological scientists reject the extra-scientific
claims of theists because they are based on context-dependent and tradition-based ways of knowing. We contend that this view pervades many
arguments for excluding theism from psychological science, and it has
important historical and philosophical contexts that warrant some consideration. In the sections to follow, we provide a selected history for the
philosophy of modern science, some postmodern appraisals of modern
science, and the conclusion that there are insufficient grounds for excluding theism from psychological science based on the common objections
to its inclusion.
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Early Roots of Science
Though many individuals contributed to the origins of contemporary science, we focus here on two: René Descartes and Isaac Newton. Descartes
left a most indelible mark on the annals of scientific and philosophical
inquiry with his leap from radical skepticism to absolute certainty (see
Toumlin, 1992). His ideas ushered in an era of scientific and philosophical progress that forever changed the pursuit for knowledge (cf. Buckley,
1987). Newton’s extraordinary ideas about physics and the nature of reality revolutionized the scientific endeavor. The mysteries of the whole
universe, it seemed, were now subject to the certainties of mathematics
(Newbigin, 1995).
For the field of psychological science, the Cartesian legacy informs a
number of significant philosophical assumptions regarding the standards
of claims to knowing, whereas the Newtonian legacy influences several
philosophical assumptions primarily about the nature of reality. These
have helped to form the usual grounds for excluding theism from psychological science; they define what science is and what it is not. Although a
comprehensive review of their impact (or that of other influential figures)
is beyond the scope of this article, we briefly discuss the early roots of four
such assumptions.
The Cartesian legacy. Descartes (e.g., 1637/2007) influenced psychological science in at least two fundamental ways. The first is evident in the
broad scientific ambition to discover context-independent knowledge (cf.
Newbigin, 1995). This is an extension of the Cartesian summons to reject
the context-dependent ways of knowing embedded within all traditions
(Cottingham, 1988; Matson, 2000). Since at least the 17th century, context-independent knowledge has been separated from and preferred over
context-dependent ways of knowing (Newbigin, 1995; Van Belle, 2005).
And, because modern science appears to be so well sanitized of contextdependent knowledge, many seem to render it more true or legitimate
than other ways of knowing (Newbigin, 1995). Therefore, it is considered
authoritative and is privileged over the extra-scientific conclusions of
many traditions (this position is typically called scientism). Science has
become venerated as a result of the Cartesian program, whereas theism
has been categorically dismissed for its context-dependent, traditionbased ways of knowing.
A second fundamental way that Descartes influenced psychological
science is apparent in its justifications for what counts as knowledge
(Murphy, 1997). These justifications stem from his presumption that
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structures of knowledge should be built in a gradual, floor-by-floor manner
on established foundations (Cottingham, 1988; Matson, 2000). The Cartesian program also tends to distrust any claims that do not follow a linear,
bottom-up approach to knowing; alternative approaches are considered
less valid (Murphy, 1997). Psychological scientists generally embrace this
theory of knowledge (called epistemological foundationalism). In doing so,
they justify their research activities as extensions or clarifications of those
things already known though the methods of science, and they assume
that their scientific conclusions will justify future research activities. However, many theistic traditions tend to make claims that are not knowable
in this way, which inclines some psychological scientists to discredit
them completely. Descartes’ epistemological foundationalism has forever
shaped scientific knowing and served as an impetus for excluding the
extra-scientific approaches to knowing used by many theistic traditions.
And all was light. Newton (e.g., 1687/1999), with his remarkable accomplishments in physics, also shaped the field of psychological science in
at least two important ways (Newbigin, 1995). First, he provided a mathematical account of complex phenomena in the natural world using more
basic units of matter (Feingold, 2004; Murphy, 1997). His calculations of
mass and force explained “everything from the movement of the stars to
the fall of an apple” and seemed to reveal a model of reality independent
of faith commitments (Newbigin, 1995, p. 29). In other words, the Newtonian program not only categorized the world into more basic elements
(a position on reality called atomism), it also made sense of more complex
phenomena using only those basic elements (reductionism: Murphy, 1997;
Van Belle, 2005). It did so without a theistic explanation of reality; the
universe seemed to make sense independent of a divine being (Newbigin,
1995). The impact of this shift cannot be underestimated for psychological
science. It has resulted in the rejection of theistic truth claims that are not
reductionist; explanations of reality now must be purged of a divine being
(Van Belle, 2005).
The apparent success of Newton’s atomist-reductionist model has
resulted in a second, though related, influence over psychological science.
It follows from his presumption that all phenomena can and should be
explained by reference to physical matter, motion, and natural laws (Van
Belle, 2005). The Newtonian program ascribes to a model of reality that
can be manipulated to produce any desired effect, like a grand machine,
and which science seems to promise the means to control (Murphy, 1997;
Van Belle, 2005). This position on reality is called mechanical materialism.
For the field of psychological science, this serves as a primary working
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premise in the pursuit of knowledge (Murphy, 1997), making claims about
causation in the material world privileged over alternative explanations of
reality. Since theists tend to hold extra-scientific explanations of reality,
which are unknowable through the methods of science, they are rejected
under the Newtonian program. Many psychological scientists refuse to
accept any theistic claims about reality that are not knowable through
the methods of science.
Appraisals of Modern Science
It seems the Cartesian program has succeeded in convincing many psychological scientists that they can know in context-independent, tradition-free ways. However, many postmodern philosophers (e.g., Foucault,
1972; Kuhn, 1996; Lakatos, 1981) have argued that science is itself a context-dependent paradigm—a tradition. For instance, Polanyi (1974) suggested that becoming a scientist involves apprenticeship to a tradition
of knowledge to acquire the necessary skills and worldviews to carry out
future scientific endeavors (see also Newbigin, 1995). This is, in no small
way, a significant objective of graduate training as a psychological scientist. Students learn to indwell the scientific tradition and rely on particular methodologies and landmark studies to continue the acquisition of
knowledge (Polanyi, 1974). It seems that psychological science is a tradition and has context-dependent ways of knowing. This is not necessarily
a bad thing, but it does deserve some consideration insofar as it serves as
a major premise for the exclusion of theistic traditions from psychological
science.
Not only is science a tradition, it is many traditions. The demarcation
problem in the philosophy of science (e.g., Feyerabend, 2010; Lakatos,
1981) has highlighted that there do not seem to be very clear distinctions
between ways of knowing that are scientific, pseudo-scientific, and nonscientific. Although they share some basic assumptions (e.g., falsifiability,
reproducibility), the various disciplines of science employ vastly different
methods to know about reality. Perhaps the methodological differences
within the natural sciences are as great as those between the natural and
social sciences. Further, the gap between astronomy and biology is at least
as wide as that between psychological science and theism. Science is not a
monolithic unit of an accepted method, but rather it is a collection of various scientific traditions (Midgley, 2004, 2011). Among other things, postmodernity has concluded that Descartes’ search for a single foundation of
context-independent, tradition-free knowledge has been unsuccessful.
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Regarding Newton’s atomist-reductionist model of reality, postmodernists would have us consider that the assumptions of science are “not based
on particular scientific evidence” and are themselves extra-scientific in
essence (Midgley, 2011, p. xiv). In other words, atomism, reductionism,
mechanical materialism, epistemological foundationalism, and scientism
are each philosophical conclusions; they cannot be known through the
methods of science (Midgley, 2004, 2011). All of science, including psychological science, is rife with extra-scientific claims about reality.
Insufficient Grounds for Exclusion
Theism relies on tradition-based, context-dependent ways of knowing
and makes extra-scientific conclusions about reality. But so does psychological science. This is not an attempt to discredit scientific knowing;
rather, it is an attempt to defend psychological science from a dangerous
misconception. Psychological scientists are able to do good work because
of their philosophical assumptions which are unavoidably context-dependent, tradition-based, and extra-scientific (cf. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999). Furthermore, choosing to reject claims that are not tradition-free,
context-independent, and scientific would both exclude theism from psychological science and fundamentally undermine the scientific endeavor.
It would cut off the nose to spite the face. Although psychological science
and theism utilize different methods to know about reality, it does not
necessarily follow that they are completely incompatible or irreconcilable.
It also does not follow that theism should be excluded from psychological
science because it relies on tradition-based, context-dependent ways of
knowing and makes extra-scientific conclusions about reality. That conclusion is a bias of scientism, and it ignores many thoughtful appraisals
of the modern scientific endeavor. Taken together, these common objections yield insufficient grounds for the exclusion of theism from psychological science.
The Argument for Including Theism
A divine being may or may not exist. Such a determination is beyond
the realm of science; it is extra-scientific. Regardless, theism ought to be
considered in behavioral science for various reasons. We suggest three:
relevance, ethics, and utility, though more could certainly be offered.
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Relevance
Social scientists study human experience which has been profoundly
shaped by religious values and beliefs throughout history. If psychological
science and the clinical methods that emerge from psychological science
are to remain relevant to the questions and struggles of everyday living,
then religious faith must be considered. Though religion has become less
important to United States residents over the past 15 years, the decline is
not as remarkable as the persistently high rates of faith. In 2010, 80% still
reported religion to be very important or fairly important to them, down
7% from 1992. Almost two-thirds (61%) belonged to a church or synagogue
and 39% had attended services in the past seven days (Gallup, 2011).
Psychologists and those studying psychology tend to be less religious
than the general population, which may give them a skewed view of the
religiousness of others. Table 1 shows the importance of religion to various
groups, with data coming from various studies that the authors have been
involved with in recent years. Among a large group of university students
(n = 1800), 76.1% reported their religion is very or fairly important to them,
a number quite consistent with the Gallup poll results just described. In
contrast, only 20.7% of American Psychological Association (APA) leaders (divisional presidents and representatives on APA Council) described
their religion to be very or fairly important. Rates among other psychology
groups vary, but all are substantially lower than the general public: 35.5%
of doctoral students, 40.7% psychology interns, 52.5% of doctoral faculty,
23.1% of doctoral program Directors of Clinical Training (DCT), and 29.0%
of internship DCTs reported religion to be very or fairly important to them
(Vogel, 2011).
While these numbers reflect disparity between psychologists and the
general public, it is important to note that psychologists, and those in
training, are not utterly non-religious. For example, one-third of doctoral
students in psychology and over half of their faculty reported religion to
be personally important. Over 15 years ago Shafrankse (1996) concluded,
“it appears that psychologists may be more similar than dissimilar to the
general population in their religious views and faith commitments” (p. 160).
The same holds true today, suggesting that theistic values are important
to consider insofar as they are relevant to how many psychologists and
psychologists-in-training understand life and even more pertinent to
those outside the field of psychology.
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Table 1. Importance of Religion among Various Groups
Group

Undergraduate students
Doctoral psychology students
Predoctoral psychology interns
Doctoral faculty
Doctoral DCTs
Internship DCTs
APA leaders

N

Mean

Std Dev

1800
110
59
40
26
38
63

4.0
2.7
3.0
3.3
2.7
2.8
2.3

1.1
1.4
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.1
1.2

Notes: All participants answered the question, “How important is your religion to you?”
on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1, “Not at all important, I have no religion” to 5,
“Very important, it is the center of my life.” Data were collected as parts of different studies.
The undergraduate student data came from Louwerse, McMinn, McMinn, & Aten (2008).
Data regarding APA leaders came from McMinn, Hathaway, Woods, and Snow (2009). All
other data are from Vogel (2011). DCT = Director of Clinical Training. The overall difference
between groups is statistically significant, F(6, 2129)=60.44, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons
using Scheffe tests reveal differences (p < .05) between undergraduate students and all
other groups and also between APA leaders and doctoral faculty.

Ethics
The inclusion of theism in psychological science is not only a matter of relevance but also a matter of ethics. Psychologists in the APA are supported
(if not mandated) by the Ethics Code (APA, 2002) to increase scientific
knowledge related to the beliefs, experiences, and values of theistic individuals. This is not a new development, as they have been encouraged to
do so for almost two decades (see APA, 1992). Including theistic religion in
psychological science satisfies an established ethic to demonstrate respect
for worldview considerations that are important to most Americans.
There are also reasons to believe the ethical impetus for considering
theistic religion within psychological science is growing. As the sociopolitical milieu of the US continues to change, the value of multicultural
diversity becomes ever more important (APA, 2003). This is as much the
case for theistic religion as it is for any other dimension of diversity, such
as ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender. The APA has responded at an
organizational level to the ethic for multicultural sensitivity by launching
The Task Force on Enhancing Diversity in the APA, hiring a Chief Diversity Officer, and promoting psychological science to diverse populations
(e.g., Anderson, 2008). Theistic religion, as a relevant dimension of multicultural diversity, is ethically important in the APA (e.g., APA, 2003, 2008)
and warrants consideration in psychological science.
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As our understanding of religion continues to develop, we become
increasingly aware of the interconnections between theism and other
dimensions of diversity (cf. Constantine, 1999). To be sure, considering
theistic religion is helpful to better understand the racial and cultural
identities of most, if not all, Americans (Cross, 1995; Harry, 1992; Leong,
Wagner, & Tata, 1995; Smart & Smart, 1992; see Vogel, 2011).
Utility
In years past, it was not uncommon to find psychologists trumpeting
the deleterious effects of theistic belief (e.g., Ellis, 1962, 1971, 1980, 1983;
Walls, 1980), but scientific results showing various health benefits associated with religious and spiritual beliefs demanded a change (e.g., Koenig,
McCullough, & Larson, 2001). The flagship journal of the APA, American
Psychologist, published a special section on health and religion less than
a decade ago (Hill & Pargament, 2003; Miller & Thoresen, 2003; Powell,
Shahabi, & Thoresen, 2003; Seeman, Dubin, & Seeman, 2003). Though not
every religious variable is positively associated with increased health, the
beneficial nature of various religious and spiritual activities and beliefs is
quite striking.
McMinn, Snow, and Orton (in press) suggested several ways that religion, including theistic religion, may help promote health. First, religion
provides a sense of meaning, which can be especially important during difficult seasons of life (Slattery & Park, 2011). The meaning derived
through theistic beliefs may also promote altruistic and pro-social behaviors, which have been shown to help mental health (Post, 2005; Schwartz,
Meisenhelder, Ma, & Reed, 2002). Second, theists often belong to faith
communities that provide social support. Shared beliefs and rituals provide hope and healing during normal life stressors and transitions (see
Pargament, 1997). Third, religious communities offer resources and help
amidst times of struggle and trouble. Clergy often provide counsel and
support for parishioners, and many clergy are open to collaborating with
psychologists to help others in times of need (Edwards, Lim, McMinn, &
Dominguez, 1999; McMinn, Aikins, & Lish, 2003).
Clinicians have also become increasingly open to considering religion
and spirituality, both as a matter of human diversity and as a protective
factor in mental and physical health (Aten & Leach, 2009; Aten, McMinn,
& Worthington, 2011; Miller & Delaney, 2005; Pargament, 2007; Richards &
Bergin, 2005; Sperry & Shafranske, 2005). Rather than trying to disabuse
clients of their faulty religious beliefs, as some clinicians once promoted
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(e.g., Walls, 1980), today’s clinical psychologist is mandated both by ethics
and research to be respectful of clients’ theistic beliefs.
Conclusion
More than a century has passed since James (1902/1961) first encouraged
psychologists to explore the religious experience. Some (e.g., Allport, 1961;
Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001; Plante, 2009; Shafranske, 1996) have
taken this task seriously, whereas others (e.g., Ellis, 1962, 1971, 1980, 1983;
Walls, 1980) seem to have been reluctant to include theism in psychology.
We believe the philosophical assumptions of modern science have been
used to justify the usual arguments for excluding theistic religion from
psychology. However, the appraisals of postmodernity (e.g., Feyerabend,
2010; Lakatos, 1981) have challenged many core assumptions of the scientific endeavor and called attention to its context-dependent, traditionbased ways of knowing. This does not invalidate psychological science,
which has immensely benefited humanity, but rather defends it from the
misconception that it is without assumptions that are shared within its
particular community. Furthermore, we contend that the relevance, ethical support from the APA, and utility of theistic religion are among the
many reasons to include it in psychological science. We hope the split
between science and religion over the 20th century will be corrected by a
rapprochement during the 21st century.
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